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AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF PAWNSHOPS 
IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM* 
Mario B. Lamberte, 
I . INTRODUCTION 
Our parents used to tell us: "The moment you start earning, 
buy some jewelry and other properties. You can pawn them 
whenever you encounter financial difficulties." This "pawnshop 
mentality" is still prevalent today. One of the reasons. 
*This is part of a larger study on the informal credit 
markets supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The 
comments of Dr. P.B. Ghate (Asian Development Bank), Dr. Mahar 
K. Mangahas (Social Weather Station), Dr. Edita A. Tan (School of 
Economics, University of the Philippines), Dr. Douglas Graham and 
Dr. Richard L. Meyer (Ohio State University) are gratefully 
acknowledged. The assistance provided by Director Ricardo P. 
Lirio and Atty. Rene Carreon of the Central Bank is partly 
responsible for the success of this study. 
**Vice-President, Philippine institute for Development Studies 
(PXDS). 
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perhaps, is the poor functioning of the banking system. Although 
bank deposit services have been made accessible to many, only 
a very few persons are able to borrow from banks* 
These days, pawnshops are popular more than ever. Not only 
are transaction costs on the part of the borrower very minimal, 
loans are also easily obtained provided an item of value can 
be presented as collateral. With their rapid expansion in the 
provinces, pawnshops have definitely taken a developmental role. 
Padilla (1985) succinctly describes their role in the following 
manner: 
"These farmers and small entrepreneurs frequently 
run out of seed money or working capital fund for their 
trade. With no acceptable collateral for bank loans, 
they would seek financial relief from usurious lenders. 
Now, they get their funds from pawnshops in the city, 
which accept various types of collaterals, such as 
jewelry and other items of value. When they need money 
for weddings, funerals, education, pilgrimage, or 
business, they go to the nearest pawnshop for funds." 
Despite its popularity, pawnshops have not been accorded 
much attention by researchers. To date, there is hardly any 
rigorous study about pawnshops. In order to partly fill this 
lacuna, this paper aims to: 
1. Briefly review the regulatory framework that guides 
the operations of pawnshops; 
2. Discuss the role of pawnshops in the financial system; 
*See Lamberte and Bunda (1988). 
3. Analyze the performance of pawnshops with special 
emphasis on the following: a) sources and uses of 
funds, b) interest rates on loans, c) profitability 
and operating efficiency of pawnshops, and d) linkages 
between pawnshops and banks; and 
4. Test for the existence of economies of scale in the 
operation of pawnshops. 
Each of these objectives are dealt with in the following 
four sections while the last section contains the concluding 
remarks. 
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H . REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Pawnshops used to operate like a sari-sari store with very 
little government control. in fact, the only time these units 
came into contact with government agencies was when they paid 
business registration fees and income taxes. They were not even 
covered by the Usury Law enacted in 1916. 
With the introduction of a set of financial reforms in 1972, 
the Central Bank was given the authority and responsibility to 
oversee the entire financial and credit system. This is 
reflective of the idea put forward by Gurley and Shaw. With 
this development, non-bank financial intermediaries, which used 
to operate beyond the purview of Central Bank regulations, came 
under Central Bank jurisdiction. In particular. Presidential 
Decree No. 114, dated 29 January 1973, and Central Bank Circular 
No. 374, dated 13 July 1973, set out specific regulations 
covering the operations of pawnshops. Like other non-bank 
financial intermediaries, pawnshops are authorized to lend but 
are not allowed to accept deposits. Thus, unlike in other 
countries, pawnshops in the Philippines belong to the formal 
financial system in the sense that they are regulated and 
supervised by the Central Bank.* 
*See Lamberte and Balbosa (1988) for a discussion of the 
institutions/individuals that belong to the formal and informal 
credit markets. 
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While the new set of regulations may have improved the 
ability of the Central Bank to stabilize the economy because of 
the expanded control over the entire financial system, it had 
definitely created some microeconomic inefficiencies. In 
particular, profits of pawnshops were squeezed because the Usury 
Law was applied to them. Other means of raising effective 
interest rates likewise become regulated. For instance, 
pawnshops may impose a service charge of 1 percent of the 
principal loan, but the maximum amount of service charge has been 
fixed at #5.00. Advanced collection of interest on loans beyond 
one year is not allowed. Moreover, pawnshops are prohibited from 
dividing the pawn into two or more fractions because this could 
raise the effective interest rate. 
These regulations, which reduce effective interest rates, 
have been accompanied by regulations which tend to increase 
costs. For instance, pawnshops are required to have a fire- and 
burglar-proof steel safe to keep their pawns and records. In 
addition, the place of business of a pawnshop, and the pawns 
pledged to it, must be insured against fire and burglary. 
As part of its supervisory powers, the Central Bank requires 
pawnshops to submit financial reports on a regular basis. It may 
conduct an examination of the financial condition of any 
pawnshop, inspect or investigate books and records, and the 
pawnshop's general business affairs administration at its own 
discretion. Sanctions may be imposed on pawnshops that have been 
found violating the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 114. 
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Although currently regulated by the Central Bank, pawnshops 
are admittedly the least regulated among the formal financial 
institutions. Those desiring to open a pawnshop do not have to 
seek prior clearance from the Central Bank, unlike other 
financial institutions such as finance companies. Also, 
branching regulations that are applied to banks are not applied 
to pawnshops. For the former, the Central Bank discourages the 
opening of more banks or bank branches in the so-called 
"overbranched" areas through prohibitive licehse fees or a high 
minimum capital requirement. For the latter, there is no limit 
as to the number of pawnshops to be opened in a certain area. 
In addition to this, the 1980 financial reforms have been 
favorable to pawnshops. In particular, the lifting of the 
interest rate ceiling tends to improve the profitability of 
pawnshops. 
The financial crisis of 1983 caused the collapse of a 
significant number of financial institutions, particularly small 
ones. Consequently, the Central Bank has become more cautious in 
granting licenses for the opening of new banks, and in fact, has 
virtually declared a moratorium on this. The Central Bank has 
instead encouraged more mergers/ consolidations among banks. 
Potential investors are encouraged to buy closed banks instead of 
opening new ones. 
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In contrast, pawnshops have been spared from such 
restriction. In fact, the minimum capital requirement for 
pawnshops imposed in 1973 has remained the same till the present, 
whereas the minimum capital requirement for banks and other non-
bank financial institutions has been increased twice since 1973. 
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I I I . PAWNSHOPS AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Financial institutions belonging to the formal financial 
system may be categorized into two groups; nalnely, the banking 
institutions and the non-bank financial intermediaries. Both are 
authorized to lend funds but the latter are not allowed to accept 
deposits. Pawnshops are classified under non-bank financial 
intermediaries. 
The Philippine financial system has been dominated by the 
commercial banking system. In 1985, about 64 percent of the 
total assets of the financial system belonged to the commercial 
banking system (see Table 1). The presence of specialized 
government banks and government non-bank financial intermediaries 
has been a special feature of the financial system. They ranked 
second and third, respectively, in terms of financial assets. 
Of the financial institutions, pawnshops constitute the smallest 
group. In 1985, their total combined assets stood at ^808 
million, which were less than 1 percent of the total assets of 
the entire financial system. However, they are by far, the most 
accessible lending institutions, especially to small firms and 
households. 
Towards the end of 1983, the country experienced its worst 
balance-of-payments crisis. However, the effect was fully felt 
only in the following year when the inflation rate soared to more 
than 50 percent. One of the consequences of the crisis is the 
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collapse of a significant number of banks while those that 
remained suffered huge runs on their deposits. The resulting 
instability of the entire financial system lasted for another two 
years. As a result, the real assets of the banking system shrank 
for three consecutive years starting in 1984 (see Table 2). 
TABLE I 
THE PHILIPPINE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 1985 
Institutional Group Total Assets 
(in aillion pesos) 
Share 
(in percent) 
A. Bankingjnstitutions 
Comaereial Banks 279,31Q;00 64.44817 
Thrift Banks 14,958.00 3.451504 
Rural Banks 8,£01.30 1.984613 
Specialized Government Banks 84,891.00 19.58724 
8 • NSDliaQLEiDiDEi iLM §I!9§!j i§Ei§§ 
Investment Houses 6,600.00 1.522845 
Financing Cospanies 6,164.00 1.422245 
Securities Dealers/Brokers 463.00 0.106830 
Investment Conpanies 10,971.00 2.531383 
Fund Managers 1,649.00 0.380490 
Lending Investors 93.00 0.021458 
Pawnshops 808.00 0,186433 
Government NBFIs 17,894.00 4.128755 
Venture Capital Corporations 125.00 0.028842 
Mutual BLAs 16.00 0.003632 
Non-Stock SLAs 847.3 0.195501 
TOTAL 433,399.00 100X 
Source: Financial Fact Book,. Central Bank o{ the Phi U r i n e s , 
1986? 
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TABLE 2 
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF PAWNSHOPS AND 
BANKING INSTITUTIONS 
Pawnshop BankingJ^ steg 
Year Real'Assets Growth Rate Real Assets Growth Rate 
(in Billion pesos) (in percent) (in aillion pesos) (in percent) 
1980 101.6 9.7 63206.2 6.0 
1981 105.9 4.2 67343.8 6.6 
1982 111.1 4.9 75061.5 11.5 
1983 114.1 2.7 82801.7 10.3 
1984 108.3 -5.0 65587.1 -20.8 
1985 119.3 10.1 55810.0 -14.9 
1986 146.6 22.9 41160.0 -26.2 
Source of Basic Data; Financial_Fact_Bookt_Central Jank_oMh§ PbiliEEine§.(yarioiis.years). 
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Although pawnshops were not spared from the adverse effects 
of an abnormally high inflation rate in 1984, they quickly 
recovered in subsequent years. in fact, the growth rates of 
their real assets after 1984 were higher than those in previous 
years. Since the real assets per pawnshop have remained almost 
the same during the period 1984-86, the significant rise in real 
assets after 1984 can only be attributed to the increase in the 
number of pawnshops (see Table 3). 
During the financial crisis, banks preferred to hold liquid 
and/or safe assets, like Treasury and Central Bank bills which 
yielded very attractive returns. It was a difficult time for all 
types of firms especially those which were dependent on banks for 
working capital. A significant number of them closed shop. 
Others, especially the small ones, tried to survive by looking 
for alternative sources of credit, such as informal moneylenders 
and pawnshops. On the other hand, consumers who suffered big 
cuts in their real incomes dug deeper into their financial 
savings. Once depleted, they started liquidating their physical 
assets. The pawnshops provided a convenient way of liquidating 
those assets. 
Indeed, the strong demand for the services of pawnshops made 
them a very attractive business venture. This has not gone 
unnoticed by small entrepreneurs. Pawnshops have sprouted in 
almost every corner of the country. Whenever a new commercial 
building is completed, chances are there is one or two new 
pawnshops that are also opened, in it. 
TABLE 3 
NUMBER AND TOTAL ASSETS OF PAWNSHOPS 
Year No. of 
Pawnshops 
Growth Rate 
in the Number 
of Pawnshops 
Total Real 
Assets 
(in sillion pesos) 
Growth 
Rate in 
Real Assets 
(in percent) 
Ave. Real 
Asset 
Size 
(in pesos) 
1980 544 9.2 101.6155 9.744 186,793 
1981 574 5.5 105.8961 4.213 184,488 
1982 622 8.4 111.1142 4.928 178,640 
1983 701 12.7 114.0697 2.660 162,724 
1984 848 21.0 108.3382 -5.025 127,757 
1985 953 12.4 119.3124 10.13 125,197 
1986 1143 19.9 146.6091 22.88 128,267 
Source of Basic Data: Central Bank. 
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During the height of the financial crisis, pawnshops were 
very selective with regard to the kind of assets they accepted as 
collateral. They preferred less bulky high-valued items like 
jewelry. Lately, however, with the stiffer competition, 
pawnshops have broadened the range of items they accept as 
collateral. Some pawnshops even accept appliances like electric 
fans and radios. The stiff competition among pawnshops has also 
brought down the effective lending rates charged. presently, 
all pawnshops no longer impose service charges and liquidated 
damage fees for overdue loans. While most pawnshops still charge 
5 percent per month for their loans, others have started giving 
discounts, especially to highly-favored clients. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF SAMPLE 
PAWNSHOPS, 1981-1986 
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This section attempts to analyze the performance of 
pawnshops. Indeed, there is very little information published by 
the Central Bank about the performance of pawnshops. perhaps, 
their size does not merit closer attention by the Central Bank, 
and the fact that there is hardly any pawnshop that has 
collapsed. If there were, it has not caused sufficient alarm 
to the general public, unlike the case of some finance companies 
that failed. 
To be able to do a thorough analysis of the performance of 
pawnshops, a sample of 100 pawnshops were drawn randomly from a 
total of 1,143 pawnshops operating as of 1986. Balance sheets 
and income statements of the sample pawnshops were obtained and 
analyzed. 
1. Basic Characteristics of the Sample Pawnshops 
Of the total sample, only 12 percent were operating before 
1981. The rest are new entrants into the market. Seventy-two 
(72) percent are located in the urban centers or cities. With 
regard to the type of ownership, only 20 percent of the total 
sample are incorporated. The great majority are single 
proprietorships and/or partnerships. 
Based on the 1986 data, the smallest pawnshop in the sample 
had assets amounting to Pl00,539, while the biggest pawnshop had 
assets amounting to #18,739,832. The average asset size for the 
sample is #1,319,117. 
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2. Sources and Uses of Funds 
Pawnshops rely to a great extent on their own funds to 
support their operations. About 70 to 80 percent of their total 
resources come from equity (see Table 4), while the rest are 
sourced from borrowings. As mentioned earlier, pawnshops are not 
authorized to mobilize deposits. Hence, the owner's capital 
serves as major source of funds. 
Loans comprise about 70 percent of the pawnshops' assets. 
The remaining balance are made up of cash reserves, deposit with 
banks, investment in financial instruments, and fixed assets. It 
is worthy to note that during the period of crisis, pawnshops did 
not switch to liquid assets as the banks did. 
Pawnshops cater mainly to small enterprises and households 
which encounter temporary liquidity problems. About 80 percent 
of the loans granted are #500 and below (see Table 5), while 
loans over #2,000 are negligible. 
The average loan size from 1981 to 1986 is presented in 
Table 6. Although the average nominal loan size increased 
between 1981 and 1983, the average real loan size declined. In 
1984, both the average nominal and real loan sizes dropped 
precipituously. Although they rebounded in the next two years, 
the 1986 average real loan size is still lover than the 1981 
level. 
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TABLE 4 
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS 
(in percent) 
Equity Loan Year Capital + Liabilities Assets 
1981 82.2 80.1 
(24.6) (14.8) 
1982 86.9 79.8 
(22.6) (13.7) 
1983 78.8 71.4 
(27.5) (18.5) 
1984 78.3 76.0 
(27.7) (17.1) 
1985 78.2 75.5 
( 2 8 . 1 ) ( 1 8 . 0 ) 
1986 81.0 71.8 
(25.8) (18.2) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Source of Basic Data: Financial Statements of a Sampleof 
Pawnshops. 
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TABLE 5 
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS GRANTED ACCORDING TO SIZE 
(in percent) 
Year 
P500 
and 
below 
§501-1*2,000 Over P2,000 Total 
1981 81.7 18.0 0.3 100 
1982 73.5 26 . 2 0.3 100 
1983 89.6 10.1 0 . 3 100 
1984 83.1 13 . 8 3.1 100 
1985 79 .8 19 .1 1.1 100 
1986 73.0 23.2 3.8 100 
Source of Basic Data: Financial Statements of a Sample of 
Pawnshops. 
TABLE 6 
AVERAGE SIZE OF LOANS GRANTED 
( in pesos) 
Year Nominal Real 
1981 212 66.8 
1982 214 62.2 
1983 173 45.0 
1984 252 43.8 
1985 305 45.0 
1986 418 60.6 
Source of Basic Data: Financial Statements of a Sample of 
Pawnshops. 
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There is no information regarding the uses of loans provided 
by pawnshops. This is because pawnshops, in practice, do not ask 
about the purpose of the loan, nor do they examine the repayment 
capacity of the borrowers since all loans are secured by 
chattels. Although there is a prohibition against lending an 
amount less than 30 percent of the appraised value of the 
security offered for the loan by the pawner, pawnshops may quote 
a lower appraised value since they make the appraisal themselves. 
Hence, pawnshops are not worried about loan defaults since they 
can sell the chattels at market price. 
There is also no information regarding the structure of loan 
maturities of pawnshops, although it is common knowledge that 
pawnshops do not lend beyond one year. In some cases, pawnshops 
may allow rollover of loans. The average ratio of total loans 
granted to total loans outstanding, which is used here as a rough 
measure of loan turnover, is about 4 (see Table 7). 
3. Interest Rates on Loans 
The Central Bank has not been monitoring the interest rates 
charged by non-bank financial intermediaries. There is a 
general perception that non-bank financial intermediaries usually 
charge higher lending rates than banks for the following reasons: 
(1) Unlike banks, non-bank financial intermediaries mainly use 
their own funds which have a high opportunity cost; and 
(2) These intermediaries service small loans and exact .high 
transaction costs per peso lent, whereas banks concentrate on 
large loans, and thereby are able to achieve economies of scale. 
TABLE 7 
THE RATIO OF LOANS GRANTED TO TOTAL LOANS OUTSTANDING 
Year Average Standard Deviation 
1981 3.85 9.85 
1982 3.78 3.50 
1983 4.20 1.79 
1984 4.21 2.89 
1985 3.87 1.74 
1986 4.45 3.17 
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The interest rate charged by pawnshops from 1981 to 1986 
were estimated using data from profit and loss statements, and 
the balance sheets of sample pawnshops. The interest rate is 
derived by taking the ratio of interest income to total loans 
outstanding. The effective interest rate is derived similarly by 
adding income from service charges to interest income. The 
results are shown in Table 8. 
It can be gathered from the results that service charges 
contributed 2 to 3 percentage points to the effective interest 
rate. This is above the prescribed service charge of one percent 
of the principal loan. The nominal interest rates have been 
consistently rising since 1982. The real interest rates followed 
the trend established by nominal interest rates, except in 1984, 
when the inflation rate went up to 50.3 percent. It can be noted 
that the real interest rates charged by pawnshops have been very 
high especially in 1986, even with an inflation rate of only 0.8 
percent. 
The average bank rates on 91-day secured loans and the 
average lending rates of three leading finance companies are also 
presented in Table 8. It can be observed that the real interest 
rates enjoyed by pawnshops were at least three times higher than 
those obtained by banks in most years. While the nominal lending 
rate charged by banks went down in 1986 as a result of excess 
liquidity experienced by the banking system, and a softening in 
the demand for credit, the nominal lending rate charged by 
TABLE 8 
LENDING RATES OF PAWNSHOPS, BANKS AND FINANCE COMPANIES 
(in percent) 
Pawnfhogs Bank Rate on EiQ§D£§_CoBjjanies 
Year iQiiEgstJate Ioterest_Rate_+_Sfrvice_Charge Secured_Lgans Noainal Real 
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real 
1981 23.8 
(8.8) 
10.7 26.5 
(9.6) 
13.4 16.5 3.4 28.0 14.9 
1982 21.6 
(9.8) 
11.4 23.4 
(11.6) 
13.2 16.5 6.3 28.9 18.7 
1983 32.1 
(12.7) 
22.1 35.3 
(14.0) 
25.3 18.6 8.6 34.3 24.3 
1984 40.4 
(23.2) 
-9.9 43.2 
(24.8) 
-7.1 26.2 -24.1 58.9 8.6 
19B5 45.6 
(28.8) 
22.5 48.2 
(29.9) 
25.1 26.9 3.8 40.4 17.3 
1986 49.5 
(32.3) 
48.7 52.2 
(33.7) 
51.4 14.0 13.2 27.5 26.7 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. Finance companies included : 
Bank of America Finance Corporation, Manila Bank Finance Company, and Filinvest 
Credit Corporation. 
Source of Basic Data: (1) Financial J U t e s e n t s j j f . a J a ^ 
(2 > Cent ral _Bank_Reyi §m_ (var i ousjear s) 
(3) Unpublished reports of finance companies. 
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pawnshops continued to go up. Strong demand for the services 
of pawnshops by households that suffered a loss in real income 
and by small firms that encountered financial difficulties, may 
have contributed to the rise in interest rates charged by 
pawnshops in 1986. 
Pawnshop and finance companies had almost the same lending 
rates during the period 1981 to 1983. In 1984, only finance 
companies were able to adjust their rates significantly above the 
inflation rate. After 1984, the lending rates of finance 
companies went down as a result of the decrease in the demand 
for consumer loans. This suggests that acquisition of new 
consumer durables considerably slowed down during the crisis 
period, while mortgage transactions covering previously acquired 
consumer durables started to pick up in pawnshops. More 
recently, the market for second-hand goods has boomed, and 
finance companies have begun financing the acquisition of high-
valued, second-hand goods, such as cars, refrigerators, etc. 
The effective interest rate charged by pawnshops has 
already gone down in 1987. As mentioned earlier, the stiff 
competition among pawnshops brought about by the influx of new 
entrants, have prompted them to do away with service charges and 
liquidated damage fees. 
4. Profitability and Efficiency of Pawnshop 
The high interest rates enjoyed by pawnshops have made 
pawnshop operations very profitable. Table 9 shows the rates of 
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TABLE 9 
RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY 
(in percent) 
Five Biggest Vear Pawnshops Commercial Banks 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
6.9 
(9.9) 
2 . 6 
(6.7) 
6 . 8 
(10.2) 
2 1 . 1 
(42.3) 
2 0 . 2 
(23.9) 
18.4 
(22.4) 
14.2 
(4.0) 
13.1 
(5.0) 
14.6 
( 6 . 0 ) 
17.4 
( 6 . 6 ) 
18.4 
(7.6) 
17.5 
(4.2) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. The five 
biggest commercial banks are:. Bank of the Philippine 
Islands, Metropolitan Bank, Allied Bank, Far East Bank, 
and Philippine Commercial International Bank. 
Source of Basic Data: (1) Financial Statements of a SgprnlR nf 
Pawnshops. 
(2) Business Day 1000 Tod Corporations 
(various years). 
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return on equity which pawnshops and the five biggest commercial 
banks realized during the period 1981 to 1986. From 1981 to 
1983, the profit rates obtained by pawnshops were considerably 
lower than those experienced by the five biggest commercial 
banks. However, during the crisis, i.e., 1984 to 1986, 
pawnshops improved considerably their profitability, while the 
five biggest commercial banks made only a modest improvement in 
their profitability. It seems that the pawnshops' profitability 
varies inversely with the state of the economy. In the recent 
period, the profitability of pawnshops is comparable with that of 
the five biggest commercial banks. With the expected 
improvements in the economy in the coming years and stiffer 
competition, the profitability of pawnshops will likely decline, 
although they will continue to be a profitable venture. 
The profitability of pawnshops may be attributed to their 
operational efficiency. The ratio of net income to gross 
operating income is used here as a rough measure of operational 
efficiency. It indicates the efficiency of management in 
controlling operational costs. Table 10 presents the indicated 
ratios from 1981 to 1986. The figures suggest that pawnshops had 
been efficient in all the years under consideration. At least 25 
percent of their gross operating income were retained as net 
profits. Moreover, the relative efficiency of pawnshops seems to 
be independent of the state of the economy. 
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Pawnshops are found to be more efficient than the five 
commercial banks. The latter's ratios of net income to gross 
operating income were less than 12 percent in all the years 
examined. 
5. Linkages with Banks 
There are two ways by which pawnshops can be linked with the 
banking system. One is that pawnshops utilize banks as a 
depository for their reserves. Table 11 shows the average 
outstanding deposits of pawnshops with banks as a percent of 
their total assets during the period 1981 to 1986. Such deposits 
are small, comprising only 4 to 11 percent of the total assets of 
pawnshops. Pawnshops need not keep a high amount of reserves 
since all their loans are secured and do not have deposit 
liabilities. 
The other way by which pawnshops can be linked with banks is 
to treat the latter as a source of additional liquidity. 
Table 11 shows the average outstanding borrowings of pawnshops 
from banks as a percent of their total resources during the 
period 1981 to 1986. About 28 to 34 percent of the resources of 
pawnshops come from borrowings. This indicates that pawnshops 
are net borrowers of funds from the banking system. The picture 
that can be gathered here is that banks provide wholesale credit 
to pawnshops, which in turn, retail them to small borrowers. 
This suggests that banks are indirectly lending to households and 
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TABLE 10 
AVERAGE RATIO OF NET INCOME TO GROSS OPERATING INCOME 
(in percent) 
Five Biggest 
Year Pawnshops Commercial Banks 
1981 24.9 9.9 
(39.6) (3.4) 
1982 12.2 8.7 
(19.5) (4.2) 
1983 29.8 9.2 
(40.4) (4.3) 
1984 34.4 8.1 
(35.6) (3.2) 
1985 28.6 10.1 
(37.9 ) (4.7) 
1986 33.7 11.4 
(35.0) (4.2) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. The five 
biggest commercial banks are indicated in Table 9. 
Source of Basic Data: (1) Financial Statements,of a Sample of 
Pawnshops 
(2) Business Day 1000 Top Corporations 
(various years) 
29 
TABLE II 
LINKAGES WITH BANKS 
Year Deposits in Banks 
as a percent of 
Total Assets 
Loans/Notes Payable 
as a percent of Total 
Resources 
1981 8.4 28.0 
(13.3) (26.9) 
1982 4.4 29.0 
(9.5) (28.3) 
1983 11.2 33.9 
(13.8) (26.2) 
1984 4.3 34.5 (5.0) (22.1) 
1985 9.9 34.2 (14.6) (23.0) 
1986 9.8 34.1 (11.6) (23.7) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Source of Basic Data: Financial Statements of a Sample of 
Pawnshops. 
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small firms through the pawnshops. The comparative advantage of 
each group of financial institutions dictate such kind of 
relationship. This is similar to the bank-trader-small farmer 
credit relationship now prevalent in the rural areas. 
v. ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
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We have noted that pawnshops are typically small and cater 
to small borrowers. One thing that immediately comes to mind is 
whether there are economies of scale that can be exploited. If 
there are, pawnshops can further improve their competitive 
advantage by increasing their size. Therefore, financial 
policies should be geared towards encouraging pawnshops to 
increase their size through mergers and/or raising the minimum 
capital requirement. Knowing the existence of scale economies in 
pawnshops is considered necessary to arrive at proper policies. 
To determine the existence of economies of scale, a simple 
quadratic cost function in logarithmic form is estimated as 
follows: 
2 
In TC = a + b (In TA) + c 1/2 (In TA) (1) 
where TC = total cost, and 
TA = total assets 
This is a convenient form since the asset cost elasticity (ACE) 
can immediately be derived from equation (1), that is: 
d In TC 
ACE = d In TA = b + c (In TA) (2) 
The ACE can vary according to the size of the pawnshops. Because 
of this feature, this model is better suited for the study's 
purpose than the popular Cobb-Douglas model. in terms of 
equation (2), the following propositions hold: 
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(a) ACE < 1 if there are economies of scale; 
(b) ACE > 1 if there are diseconomies of scale; and 
(c) ACE = 1 if there are constant returns to scale. 
Equation (1) was estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method, using the data for 1986 in the estimation 
procedure. Sixteen (16) observations were dropped from the 
sample because of incomplete information. The estimated 
equation is as follows: 
2 
In TC = -14.76 + 3.12 In TA - 0.17 1/2 (In TA) 
(-1.47) (2.12) (-1.57) 
- 2 
R .53 F = 48 
The estimated asset cost elasticities are presented in Table 
12. The results show that about 70 percent of the sample 
pawnshops are experiencing economies of scale. This implies that 
these pawnshops can improve their competitive advantage further 
by increasing their size. Of the remaining sample, 11 percent 
are operating in the region of constant returns to scale while 
19 percent are already operating in the region of scale 
diseconomies. However, such scale diseconomies are mild. Among 
those experiencing scale diseconomies, the highest asse-t cost 
elasticity coefficient is only 1.18. 
The asset cost elasticity evaluated at the mean is 0.88. 
This implies that the average size pawnshop is enjoying 
substantial scale economies. 
In general, the results suggest a policy that would 
encourage pawnshops to increase their size. 
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TABLE 12 
ESTIMATED ASSET COST ELASTICITIES 
Observation Asset Cost Elasticities 
1 0.662696 0 .788653 
3 1.159673 0 .801306 0.861058 1.159589 0 .978793 
8 0.916703 0 .839996 1.093000 1.029124 0 .942442 
13 0.877689 1 .009499 1.123255 1.042068 1 .646852 
18 0.558658 0 .569987 0.600548 1.100779 1 .043406 
23 1.129880 0 .978619 0.831521 0.809590 1 .067311 
28 0.919465 0 .863773 0.868122 0.829624 0 .745489 
33 1.092034 0 .877028 0.961920 0.901271 0 .786234 
38 1.063315 0 .948170 0.927334 0.734496 0 .881234 
43 1.741294 0 .895725 1.036372 1.027883 1 .009711 
48 0.843445 0 .933924 0.809158 0.804428 0 .515235 
53 0.543289 0 .862697 0.592164 1.150442 0 .977917 
58 0.712833 0 .296176 0.815901 0.771178 0, .522222 
63 0.841497 0, .699086 0.870408 0.797259 1, .128507 
68 0.596127 1, .176131 0.967315 1.086868 0. .780515 
73 1.116721 0, .803514 1.012201 0.315772 0. .666368 
78 0.903843 1. .132222 1.123257 1.165963 0. ,956441 
83 0.907937 1. 002230 
34 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
One might be tempted to ask at this point whether pawnshops 
and banks are substitutes or complements. Our results cannot 
give us an unequivocal answer to this question. What is clear, 
however, is that pawnshops have carved out their own niche in the 
financial market, servicing small borrowers who could not be 
accommodated by the banking system. The rapid expansion of 
pawnshops and the decline of the banking system in the last few 
years does not serve as an indicator that pawnshops are indeed 
substitutes. During the period of crisis starting in 1983, the 
contraction of the formal financial system mirrored the state of 
the entire economy. On the other hand, pawnshops, like the 
informal moneylenders, have provided a safety net to small firms 
and households who suffered liquidity problems during the same 
period. Certainly, big firms did not shift to pawnshops during 
hard times. They either closed shop or reduced the size of their 
operations. 
pawnshops may have taken away some of the customers of the 
informal credit markets. Because of their rapid expansion, both 
in the urban and rural areas, pawnshops have provided small 
borrowers an alternative source of credit. Being less regulated, 
pawnshops can compete well with informal moneyllenders, especially 
in cases where borrowers have some collateral to offer. Also, 
the recent proliferation of pawnshops has stimulated more 
competition in the credit market. This being the case, there is 
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some merit in maintaining a liberal policy towards pawnshops. 
Policies regulating the interest rate and entry of pawnshops 
would just reverse the gains which society, in general, and small 
borrowers, in particular, realize with the proliferation of 
pawnshops. 
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